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B O O K    R E V I E W 
Dmitry Adamsky, Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2019. $30.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-5036-0864-1.  
Reviewer:  James R. Payton, Jr., Professor Emeritus of History, Redeemer University, Ancaster, 
Ontario, Canada. 
In this book Dmitry Adamsky tells a remarkable story which, only thirty-five years ago, 
would have come across as a wild-eyed dream (or, possibly, nightmare). As he shows, though, 
this is not a phantasm: it is the reality in Russian today, a reality the rest of the world does well to 
take note of.  
As the Soviet Union was collapsing, resentment toward the enormous amounts of funding 
and focus devoted during the post-World War II period to the Soviet Union’s nuclear warfare 
capacities, while so many of the needs of its citizens found little more than neglect, fed into a 
cold disdain within much of the Soviet Union’s populace toward those who had valorized and 
those who still participated in that nuclear competition. Beyond that, resentment found moral 
suasion as people from around the globe—and within the USSR itself—openly denounced 
nuclear weaponry and the threat it posed to humanity’s existence: opposition to such weapons of 
mass destruction scored high on morality scales. With all this, the various segments of the 
Russian military associated with nuclear weaponry became the focus of popular disdain and, in 
the aftermath of the wide-ranging changes brought in during the final years of the Soviet Union, 
governmental neglect.  
At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church [ROC], oppressed and persecuted for 
most of the Communist period, had lost so much of the centuries-long sway it had enjoyed 
within the Russian nation. Prohibited from engaging in its catechetical and culture-shaping 
activities for most of the twentieth century, the ROC had lost influence over “Holy Mother 
Russia.” The Byzantine legacy of church/state symphonia had been ruthlessly repudiated in the 
Communist-governed state which had long been exalted as “The Third Rome.” The ROC had 
continued, to be sure; what role it might play in the post-Soviet Russian nation was unclear, 
though. Any supposition of a return to symphonia of some sort would have come across like 
foolish nostalgia. 
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 Dmitry Adamsky tracks how the leadership of the ROC managed to come alongside the 
beleaguered nuclear forces within the Russian military to encourage them and stand with them. 
Championing these forces as the defenders of the fatherland against threats from a secularizing 
West, the ROC sought both to raise the morale of the Russian nuclear military and also to insert 
itself within an undeniably strategic component of the Russian military. These forces proved 
only too willing to receive this support and to welcome the ROC offers of churches on military 
bases and military priests to serve those churches and catechize recruits. The initiators of this 
rapprochement were the ROC patriarchs themselves, Alexei and later Kirill: they spawned and 
promoted this reclaiming of the Russian military as “Christ-loving warriors” defending the cause 
of the Third Rome against the hordes of threatening secularism emanating from the West.  
 Adamsky’s treatment is thorough and masterful. He shows how this endeavor has 
developed over three decades, which he styles “genesis” (1991–2000), “conversion” (2000–
2010), and “operationalization” (2010–2020). Each of these three parts of this impressive volume 
is sub-divided into “State-Church Relations,” Faith-Nuclear Nexus,” and “Strategic 
Mythmaking.” The result is a detailed presentation and assessment of how this intimate 
relationship between Russian nuclear forces and the ROC developed within each decade; the 
parallelism of structure allows readers to see the overall unfolding of each component from the 
end of the Soviet Union to the present.  
 The volume is carefully written: each paragraph is packed with material, all of it well-
sourced. (Eighty pages of footnotes support the presentation. Much of this is in English 
translation, and what is not is in transliterated Russian.) A brief review cannot begin to do justice 
to the manifold small steps taken, each building on what had gone before, and all this within 
long-recognized and revered ROC practices, on the one hand, or the increasing welcome 
afforded by the leadership of the Russian nuclear military. Interesting sidelights about the 
developing piety of Vladimir Putin through these decades offer intriguing possibilities for 
assessing him as Russian leader and how to perceive the nature of the reinvigorated church/state 
symphonia as it has unfolded to this point.  
 It is important to note that the author indicates that the “conversion” of the personnel of 
the Russian nuclear forces has proceeded only slowly. Adamsky shows the numerous means 
adopted to facilitate that conversion, but his focus has been more on the relationship of the ROC 
and the leadership of those forces—which has been, undeniably, impressive in apparent 
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effectiveness. One must read the footnotes to get a more complete picture of the depth of the 
changes for the members of the forces themselves.  
 As the volume comes to its end, the author points out what he sees as an important 
development that must take place—namely, the articulation of canon law and Orthodox ethical 
teaching to address directly questions raised by the possible exercise of nuclear power. He does 
not draw on the ground-breaking position statement, “The Orthodox Church and Society: The 
Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church” (an extended document adopted by 
the Jubilee Bishops’ Council of the ROC in August 2000), to begin to speak into this question. 
This will surely be a foundational document for the eventual elaboration of such ethical teaching.  
 Two decades into the twenty-first century, the twentieth-century conceit that religion was 
fading from the public scene seems remarkably quaint. As we all have seen, religion continues to 
play a strikingly important role in contemporary life, from the basic elements of personal piety 
through all the hostilities we have seen break out around the world in the three decades since the 
Soviet Union breathed its last. To note in the present day that the ROC has such influence within 
and upon one of the major nuclear arsenals in the world occasions, to say the least, legitimate 
concern.  
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